Fault as the Basis of Liability by Orr, George W.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 21 | Issue 4 Article 3
1954
Fault as the Basis of Liability
George W. Orr
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
George W. Orr, Fault as the Basis of Liability, 21 J. Air L. & Com. 399 (1954)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol21/iss4/3
FAULT AS THE BASIS OF LIABILITY*
By GEORGE W. ORR
Director of Claims, United States Aircraft Insurance Group, New
York, N. Y.
F we confine our consideration to the relationship to liability
insurance of the degree of liability imposed, the answer could be
summarized in the one word: "basic." The degree of fault required
to constitute liability has everything to do with both the acceptance
of an insurance risk and the cost to the insured. The degree might be
so drastic that the risk would be undesirable for insurers, and certainly
the greater the degree of liability imposed, the greater the cost of
satisfying that liability, whether or not there is insurance.
There are astonishing misapprehensions about insurance and about
aviation-fixed ideas that sometimes are so completely unsupported in
fact that it is incomprehensible that persons of high intelligence could
accept them. Unfortunately, these erroneous ideas are being accepted
as important factors in demanding changes in liability laws. I shall
try to correct several of them in this paper by turning upon them the
revealing light of fact and reason.
The first general misunderstanding is an almost universal con-
fusion as between accident insurance and liability insurance. Our
scholars deride such an idea. They say "of course, we know that acci-
dent insurance pays a specified benefit upon proof of specified injuries,
without regard to liability, whereas liability insurance protects the
insured from loss because of his legal liability." But they go blithely
along with the uninformed in the firm conviction that if a person is
injured or killed, regardless of the circumstances of the injury, he or
his heirs should be paid. In other words, they expect all insurance
to function like accident insurance and consider the defense that no
payment is due, because there is no legal liability, a resort to a mere
technicality in an effort to avoid payment.
Of course, most educated men know the difference in the theory
but many let their ideology get mixed up with their intelligence. It is
their social belief that in any activity that causes injury or damage the
operator should pay for it, regardless of fault, so they would force their
belief on the world by making laws that would in effect convert lia-
bility insurance into compulsory accident insurance.
If accident insurance is what is wanted, it is quite simple - and
quite as unintelligent, arbitrary and unjust - to simply provide by law
that every passenger or member of the public be insured with accident
insurance and every claim for property damage paid without question
*A paper prepared for the International Academy of Comparative Law
meeting in Paris, August 1954.
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as to fault. Although most proponents of absolute liability regardless
of fault will stoutly maintain that they are not socialists - especially
in the U. S. A. where socialism is not popular - this is socialism pure
and simple. It is nothing more or less than the Marxian axiom: "To
everyone according to his needs; from everyone according to his
means." However, this paper is concerned, not with accident insur-
ance, but with liability insurance and the relationship of fault to it.
If fault as a basis for liability is to be considered at all, it must rest
upon the desire to achieve justice as between the air carrier and those
his activities may injure. That must be the basic objective, not the
satisfying of a social theory. If we wish to provide privilege for one
class against another - if we want to penalize constructive service to
the public by making the server the insurer of the served under any
and all circumstances, this discussion is useless because that is class
discrimination, not justice.
If justice is our objective, there must be equality to all to achieve
real justice. Insurance should not be the basic consideration. Insur-
ance is only one - although admittedly the most practical and eco-
nomical - way to provide financial responsibility and the only way to
distribute a loss that would be crushing to one operator over a large
section of a whole industry. Let us try to achieve justice first by con-
sidering the relation of fault as a basis of liability to justice and then
consider the place of insurance in the picture. Equal justice is the basic
objective - insurance merely an instrument of achieving that justice.
May I digress briefly here to dispel another misapprehension about
insurance? Too many otherwise intelligent persons believe, because
insurance companies must be strong financially in order to fulfill their
function of paying claims, that they are fair game for plundering. Also,
that they try to hold liability requirements low to avoid paying out
their money. Not one of these accusations is true, and especially with
respect to air carrier insurance.
Insurance companies are business organizations, not gamblers or
philanthropists. Insurance is one of the most strictly regulated and
most highly competitive industries. There are few air carriers in all
the world to insure. U.S. air carriers, which fly twice as many passen-
ger-miles as all of the other nations of the free world combined, had
only 1,227 airplanes in service' in 1952. Air carriers pay premiums
largely based upon a combination of individual and industry experi-
ence. The insurer does not charge a premium and then try to cut
corners and chisel claimants so they can make a profit. They charge a
premium to cover the cost of claims, expense of doing business and
handling claims, plus a fair profit, if they can keep their operations
competitively efficient. It is not finally insurance company money
being paid out for claims but air carrier money. If costs exceed pre-
mium, the premium goes up. There must be money with which to
operate and pay claims. The adjuster haggles over excessive demands
I OAA Statistical Handbook 1953.
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to keep air carrier premiums down, not to save insurance companies
money.
Because I am employed by insurance companies, I am charged with
serving the self-interest of the insurance industry in attempting to keep
limits down and permissible defenses against liability strong. Nothing
could be further from the truth. The imposition of high limits of
liability and the limiting of defenses by which liability may be avoided
increases claim costs. This increased volume in the cost of losses makes
increased premium volume inevitable. Insurance profits are permit-
ted on volume, so when you increase the volume, more profits are per-
missible. To oppose high limits and ineffective defenses against
liability restricts rather than augments insurance profits except per-
haps for the long range view that what is good for the air carrier and
encourages his development is ultimately good for his insurer. No, I
am not an insurance propagandist. I have devoted most of my life
to the law and to aviation - about half and half - and those are my
interests. My whole ambition is to keep the law just to all - not a
special class - and to see aviation unhampered by special privilege to
the end that it may achieve its great destiny as a servant of man - all
men.
To return to our principal theme; what is equal justice in relation
to liability? It is certainly not a special privilege to any one class. The
evolution of the concept of liability has progressed with the develop-
ment of society. We hear of it first in those primitive days when asso-
ciated strength was necessary for survival: The dispenser of justice was
the chief - then the over-lord and his barons - then the absolute mon-
arch. These were the days of absolute liability - an eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth! The ancient Anglo-Saxon legal maxim: "Buy spear
from side or bear it" clearly illustrates the theory of that primitive
stage when the offender must buy off the vengeance of the offended or
fight it out.
As law supplanted this crude dominence of force, reparation for
wrong became something the injured could exact. A great first step
was taken to get away from the absolute liability that resulted when a
person or his animals damaged another: the moral idea developed that
liability should be based on fault as a substitute for a penalty exacted
to avoid vengeance. Along with this moral awakening came another
important social gain. Society was no less affected by negligence than
by injury caused by willful aggression. Others should not be subjected
to unreasonable risk or injury through want of due care. Fault could
include both intentional aggression and negligence. Moral responsi-
bility became legal liability.
We find this first recognized in the ancient culture of Babylon.2
Of more modern influence, the early Roman law, well before the time
2 In Babylonian Law, Vol. I, Driver & Miles ask: "Is not the ancient punish-
ment of one whose carelessly built house collapsed on someone a clear beginning
of our law of negligence?"
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of Christ,3 included the doctrine of Aquilian culpa. Lex Aquila pro-
vided for damages done wrongfully, a juristic equitable development
covering cases of fault which was not intentional aggression. It became
modern Roman law in the Code Napoleon: "Any act whatever done
by a man which causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault
the damage was caused to repair it."
In the common law of the English speaking peoples, progress was
much slower. Absolute liability for injury to person or property re-
sisted progress into the seventeenth century. However, toward the
end of the sixteenth century, the theory of justice was gaining. In the
Lord Cromwell case 4 Coke tells us that the King's Bench held that a
statute was against common right and reason and so void, where it
provided that "those who do not offend are to be punished." That, of
course, is exactly what liability regardless of fault permits - the pun-
ishment of one non-offending party for the benefit of another.
Our honored Roscoe Pound, whose fine scholarship, balanced
mentality and intellectual honesty has been of great help to me, has
summarized the legal liability situation in U. S. law at the end of the
first half of the present century thus: "One is liable in damages for (1)
intentional aggression upon the personality or substance of another
unless he can establish justification or privilege; (2) negligent inter-
ference with person or property, i.e., failure to come up to the legal
standard of care whereby injury is caused to the person or property of
another; and (3) unintended non-negligent interference with person
or property of another through failing to restrain or prevent the escape
of some thing or agency which one maintains or employs that has a
tendency to get out of bounds and do harm."
As Dr. Pound admits, there is still argument as to (1) and (3), but
it is my belief that this brief resume is a sound statement of the law
as our courts are applying it in the U. S. now. To relate it back to our
subject, air carrier liability would come under (2) liability as based
upon fault - want of the exercise of due care - unless they can be
brought under (3) failure to control an agency that has a tendency to
get out of bounds and do harm. As I shall discuss later, the airplane in
the hands of the air carrier has proven conclusively that it does not
have a tendency to get out of bounds and do harm. Thus, it should
not come under (3) but should be held only responsible for injury
caused by fault - the failure to exercise due care.
We find liability imposed somewhat differently by the world's two
general systems of law: (I) the Code System, and (2) the Common Law
System unique to the English speaking nations. Under both systems,
the general rule has been that fault is the basis of liability.
The method of proving fault has differed. Most nations using the
Code System have imposed presumptive liability upon the common
8 From reference in Monroe's Ad Legum Aquillian and Max Radin's Roman
Law the passage of Lex Aquillia was during the second century B.C.
4 4 Co. 12b, 13a (1578).
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(including the air) carrier. This, of course, means that while liability
is automatically imposed, it may be avoided by proof that due care
has been used - as defined by the laws of the nation involved. I would
say from my wide international experience, rather than from actual
research, that the majority of nations impose presumptive liability,
although the definition of due care varies widely.
A good example of this degree of liability is included in the so-called
Warsaw Convention of 1929 which has been accepted by most major
nations of: the world. The burden of proof is on the carrier to prove
due care. Being so near the code requirements of most adherents,
many nations have adopted the Warsaw standard of liability for their
domestic and non-Warsaw standard to effect uniformity.
The Common Law standard is different. The burden of proving
fault is on the claimant. The definition of due care is rigid - the
carrier must use the highest degree of care. There is applied the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur which creates an inference of fault under
certain conditions and assists in proving lack of due care But the
burden remains on the plaintiff to prove fault. The United Kingdom,
one of the common law nations, has adopted the presumptive liability
of the Warsaw Convention for its air carriers.6
The U. S. laws are based upon the kind of government which we
in America have conceived since our independence. They presume
a government which maintains peace, order, general security and free
opportunity. To us, security has meant protection from the aggression
or wrong doing of others. But today in too much of the world security
is conceived to include security against one's own fault, improvidence,
bad luck and even defects of character.7 The idea, called humani-
tarian, embraces the principle of repairing at the expense of someone
else who has the means to pay, all loss to everyone, no matter how
caused. It presupposes that every member of society today has the
right to expect a full economic and social life, regardless of individual
effort and useful production. Such idealists call for the law to guaran-
tee a full economic and social life for every victim of loss, for every-
one who for any reason cannot keep pace with the world or attain his
expectations. Such liability beyond that for fault, or attached to fault,
could not escape ultimately putting an unbearable burden upon
enterprise.
In an overemphasis of humanitarian ardor, much of the world is
turning to the welfare or service state; legislators and jurists are im-
posing absolute liability. Idealists sincerely believe they are advocat-
ing the welfare of society while the political demagogue appeals to the
human greed of the voting public with various "something-for-nothing"
schemes. As Marx taught, let the rich pay. Such people call them-
selves "liberals" (being liberal with other's money) and "progressive"
5 Orr, Airplane Tort Law, Feb. 1952 Insurance Law Journal 120.6 U. K. Statutory Instruments, 1952, No. 158; 1952 US&CAvR 15.
7 Pound, "Law in the Service State," Proceedings, ABA Ins. Sec. 1950, p. 33.
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in that they advocate change, even though change is not always prog-
ress. They overlook the first axiom of life: One can only use what has
been created. One regime can steal from the treasure stored up by its
predecessors but finally production must equal consumption to main-
tain existence.
Liability without regard to fault is reaction, pure and simple - back
to the days of class privilege and injustice to one class for the benefit
of another. But it is gaining, nevertheless, even as the service state is
gaining. Because this social movement has gained wide support dur-
ing the past half century, and particularly during the past quarter cen-
tury, many sincere students of the law have accepted it as an inevitable
trend. It is my humble but earnest belief that this trend should not
be accepted but resisted to the utmost. We have seen socialism in its
various political forms destroy proud nations and bring others that
have been leaders in our modern civilization to the point of impotence.
When equal justice is sacrificed for special privilege, no matter how
deserving of "human justice" the privileged class may be, progress
stops and we sacrifice centuries of real social progress by inevitably
reverting to the primitive concept that might makes right. Only the
dictator's might can supplant incentive - the right of free men to
profit by their own effort - and his only effective instrument is slavery.
No matter how popular the trend, if it is against human nature and
destructive, thinking men must resist.
The trend of absolute liability is a social trend. It is illustrated
by the standard of liability in the Rome Convention, although that
Convention has never been accepted by the major nations of the world.
We thus now have three degrees of liability:
1. Liability based solely on fault.
2. Presumed liability.
3. Absolute liability.
Absolute liability is being pressed with regard to air carriers re-
gardless of the most recent action of the Legal Committee of the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization in its suggested revision of the
Warsaw Convention and regardless of the proven safety record of the
air carriers. The ICAO Legal Committee retained presumptive lia-
bility as the standard of liability required by the Warsaw Convention.
This recognized fault as the basis of liability. The proven record of
the air carrier with respect to liability to all - passenger, cargo and
persons and property on the surface is most convincing. Yet pro-
ponents of laws and treaties imposing special liability upon aviation
constantly cite this record, in their effort to support such laws, either
incorrectly or use statements that are true in themselves but which,
because they do not tell the whole story, give an incorrect impression
to those persons who are uninformed on the subject of aviation - which
includes most otherwise well informed lawyers.
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I have chosen an articles for analysis published in 1952 which pre-
sented a pro and con discussion by an author of unquestioned scholar-
ship, sincerity and integrity but which arrives at a conclusion that I
just as sincerely believe to be unwarranted - that legislation imposing
special liability is needed for aviation. My views were shared by a
group of outstanding practicing attorneys9 when the same conclusion
was incorporated in a report by that same author in 1941.
Eight pertinent questions are posed and statements - not neces-
sarily accepted as true by that author - are advanced as being perhaps
typical of those usually advanced by proponents of legally imposed
liability.
Before considering those eight questions, I would like to mention
some statements we often hear, entirely true as far as they go, that give
a completely false impression that there is great pressure in the U.S.A.
for legislation imposing liability upon aviation. There undoubtedly
is persistent pressure - from a small but vocal minority including some
competent legal scholars - but I believe that we have abundant proof
that it is not the desire of the great majority of the American public.
It can be correctly stated that in 1922 a Uniform State Law for
Aeronautics prescribed the liability of aviation to persons and prop-
erty on the ground and that this Act was adopted in whole or in part
by more than twenty-four states. That much of the record would
indicate that there was a general demand as early as 1922 for imposing
liability on aviation. When the whole story is known, however, it
proves the exact opposite to be true. In the first place, the law was
primarily one to declare state sovereignty over air space and to provide
for control of the civil aviation anticipated in the future. Just one
lone section - Section 5 - imposed special liability on aviation and
that applied only to injury to persons and damage to property on the
surface by aircraft in forced landings. Secondly, the majority of the
states repudiated the absolute liability section by never passing it
originally and all but ten that originally passed it have repealed or
amended that section to discontinue the absolute liability. An avia-
tion industry has developed and proved that such discrimination
against it was unjust. An overwhelming majority of the United States
8 Sweeney-Is Special Aviation Liability Legislation Essential? 19. Journal
of Air Law and Commerce, 166; 317.
9 Report of Committee on Aeronautical Law to the 1942 meeting N. Y. State
Bar.
"The proposed federal legislation rests upon the asserted premise that the
common law rules of liability have operated unsatisfactorily and unjustly as be-
tween operators by air on the one hand, and passengers on the other. The premise
has not been established in the Sweeney Report which does not contain facts,
statistics or cited cases to sustain the assertion. Considering the success or failure
of the common law rules of liability by examination of the reported cases over
the last thirteen years, there is little, if any, evidence to indicate that substantial
injustice has been done as between operators by air and the travelling or general
public. There is no reported aviation decision where the common law rules have
been judicially condemned as insufficient or inadequate to accomplish justice be-
tween the parties; on the other hand, and even in cases involving the difficult
question of rights in air space, the courts seem to have found the principles of
common law to have sufficient flexibility to work out an equitable solution to the
particular problem." Reaffirmed by same Committee in 1952.
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have thus repudiated absolute liability even to persons and property
on the surface.
The fact is often correctly cited that in 1938 - before there was
an aviation industry of consequence (the airlines were then just reach-
ing the one million passengers a year mark) the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws considered promulgating
to the states a model code called the Uniform State Liability Act. This
code incorporated the principle of absolute liability. This is supposed
to indicate that there was popular pressure for such legislation. The
facts are that it produced nationwide opposition - within and outside
the then infant aviation industry - so great that the newly created
Civil Aeronautics Authority asked the Commissioners to delay rec-
ommending the model code to the states pending federal study. I was
present at the meeting when this was done.
The Authority (changed in 1940 to the Civil Aeronautics Board)
delegated the study to its legal staff and one of its staff members made
a voluminous and most scholarly report, a copy of which was widely
distributed in 1941, which recommended federal legislation. The re-
port was never adopted or approved by the Authority and neither the
Authority nor its successor, the CAB, has in the intervening thirteen
years officially recommended the legislation recommended in the said
study. This lack of action certainly indicates that the Board has not
felt that there was popular pressure for such legislation. The matter
has not been left in doubt, however. Bills were introduced in several
different Congresses imposing liability on the airlines, none of which
passed. It is therefore clearly evident that, instead of there being
popular pressure for such legislation, such pressure is against it.
Some years later, when the CAB had done nothing about their
study, the Commissioners' Aeronautical Code Committee revived a
similar code but the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws refused
to adopt the code at all at their meeting in Seattle, Washington in
1948. Apparently, they had by now plenty of proof of its undesirabil-
ity and unpopularity. If there was any implication of pressure for
legislation imposing liability on aviation in the Commissioners' 1938
action - which I am satisfied there was not - they certainly set the
record straight after the air carrier had proved the injustice of such
discrimination by actual performance.
Eight questions are posed in considering whether special liability
legislation for aviation is needed and statements, pro and con, are
advanced for consideration. I have attempted to supply correct and
up-to-date data to correct erroneous statements and implications which
are often advanced by proponents of imposed liability and too often
accepted by persons uninformed with respect to aviation.
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1. Do Accidents Occur More Frequently in Air Transportation than
in Other Forms of Transportation?
The statement is often made that more people are killed per
passenger mile on airplanes than on railways or buses. Since the fig-
ures are not given, we are apparently supposed to infer that the differ-
ence is so great as to demand special liability legislation. While it is
true that more people are killed per passenger mile on airplanes, the
difference is so slight and the air carrier experience so good that the
implication that a more drastic liability should therefore be imposed
on the air carrier is not justified. U. S. railways, buses and air carriers
have all recently had less than one fatality for each one hundred mil-
lion passenger miles. In 1952 and 1953 domestic airlines had a fatality
rate of 0.4 and 0.6 per one hundred million miles, and the average for
the past seven years has been little over one fatality per 100 million.
That is equivalent to flying around the earth some 4,000 times. Cer-
tainly, such a record does not justify special legislation.
It is generally and quite correctly admitted that non-fatal injury
is much higher on surface carriers than air carriers. But another in-
correct statement that is accepted by the uninformed general public
and has adversely prejudiced their conclusions as to aviation liability
is too often heard: that in most major airline accidents all of the occu-
pants of the plane have been killed outright. That statement is in-
correct now and has been so for a long time. The only way it could be
true would be to classify as a major accident only those in which all
of the occupants had been killed. The truth is that a very small
percentage of passengers are killed in serious aircraft accidents. Con-
sidering only accidents so serious as to be classified by the CAB as
destruction or substantial damage to the aircraft involved or death of
one or more persons aboard, a study of all thirty seven accidents from
December, 1946 to May, 1948 reveals that only 8% of the passengers
involved were seriously injured or killed. That was typical. For in-
stance, my study of the most recent figures available 0 reveals that out
of 760 passengers aboard in all 30 such accidents in 1952, only 46
persons were killed-6%. In the same 30 accidents, only 15% were
either killed or seriously injured. Eliminating accidents in which the
airplane was substantially damaged and counting only accidents in
which the airplane was destroyed or one or more persons aboard killed
-which should be "major" enough for anyone-only slightly over
11% were killed. To say that all passengers aboard in major accidents
are killed is cruelly unfair to aviation in a consideration of liability.
It has no foundation whatever in fact.
Since even proponents of imposed liability have to admit that in-
jury to persons on the surface is a rarity, it is difficult to understand
the arbitrary injustice of imposing absolute liability on aviation in
connection with "innocent" third parties and their property on the
10 CAB Resume of Air Carrier Accidents, May 15, 1953.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ground - as is done by the proposed Rome Convention and its revision.
To merely say that such injury is a rarity is a bit too conservative to
adequately depict the true situation. Here are the facts:
Over 16,000,000 take-offs and landings were made in the U.S. dur-
ing 1951 without even one fatality to persons on the surface. The acci-
dents near the Newark, New Jersey airport aroused much interest.
Millions upon millions of take-offs and landings had been made at the
Newark airport but Newark had an unblemished safety record for
twenty yearsl And it should be remembered that nearly a third of all
plane movements in the N.J.-N.Y. metropolitan area were handled
at Newark -some 1,355,000 passengers and 110,000,000 pounds of
airmail and cargo in 1951 alone.1 '
The Civil Aeronautics Board developed statistics on all air carrier
accidents which involved fatalities to persons on the ground in the
whole United States from March, 1946 to March 7, 1953 - six years.
There were only six such accidents on that list, including the Elizabeth
accidents, and there were only four more such accidents in which
persons on the ground were non-fatally injured. In the next place,
the death toll, as deplorable as any death is, was comparatively small.
In the Elizabeth-Newark area, there were only twelve persons on the
ground killed in those Elizabeth crashes, although the propagandists
always added the persons on the plane to make the list more impressive
and to create the erroneous impression, which many have, that many
persons on the ground were killed. Compare these twelve deaths with
550 persons on the ground - pedestrians - killed by automobiles in the
Newark-Elizabeth area just since 194112_ 550 persons on the ground
killed by automobiles while only a dozen were killed by landing or
departing airplanes from busy Newark Airport in twice that time.
Only 15 persons on the ground have been killed (the Elizabeth dozen
and three killed in the Jamaica, New York accident) in the greater
New York area in the last ten years, whereas 5,865 pedestrians have
been killed in that area by automobiles.' s I mentioned above six acci-
dents in the whole United States in six years. Only 21 persons on the
ground were killed in those six accidents. In the six years (1945-1950)
60,600 pedestrians were killed by automobiles.' 4 The point at issue
is that the airplane is being called ultra hazardous when the auto-
mobile, which is not so held 1" is taking some 3,000 times more lives
of third parties on the surface.16There are more facts from the authoritative report of the General
Doolittle Committee to the President:17 "Even bicycles kill more in-
nocent bystanders annually than aeroplanes." As a matter of fact,
seventeen were killed by bicycles alone in 1949 - more than airlines
11 Rickenbacker before N. J. Legislative Comm., March 21, 1952.
12 National Safety Council.
13 Greater New York Safety Council.
14 Note 12 supra.
15 Except in Florida.16 21 to 60,600.
17 Sec. 4, Analysis of Risk.
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have killed in using Greater New York (including new Jersey) airports
in twenty years! Does that sound like the airplane is extra hazardous
to "innocent" persons on the ground?
The Doolittle report says further: "In 1946-1951 there were ap-
proximately 6,500,000 landings and take-offs by aircraft of scheduled
and non-scheduled lines for each crash claiming the lives of people on
the ground." Even including the disastrous Elizabeth accidents of
1952, the ratio was only reduced to 4,000,000 to 1. Does that sound
like ultra hazard or that it has a tendency to get out of bounds or do
harm? I submit that the actual record as given here clearly indicates
that to impose special liability legislation on air carriers would be
rank injustice.
2. Do an Appreciable Number of Persons Injured by Aircraft Have
No Redress at Common Law Because Such Accidents Are Generally
Not Due to the Legal Negligence of the Aircraft Operator?
We hear the statement made that many aircraft passengers are not
able to recover under common law principles of negligence because
many aircraft accidents are the result of vis major, unavoidable acci-
dent, misconduct of a third person, or undetermined causes. Author-
ity for the statement is seldom given because it is as inaccurate as the
statement that all passengers were killed in major accidents. As the
lawyer who has directed the handling of more airline death settlements
and litigation than any other man in this hemisphere, I can say that
failure to recover damages for the reasons given would be a negligible
fraction.
Dean John H. Wigmore is quoted as having said that not in 20%
of the accidents thus far would it be possible for the plaintiff to prove
the cause of the accident. This writer has greatest respect for Professor
Wigmore's legal scholarship. He was one of our great legal scholars.
However, I have found even under modern conditions the most ex-
perienced trial lawyer cannot predict what a jury will or will not find.
But Dean Wigmore's statement is utterly worthless today, regardless
of what it was worth when he made it. The tools with which the plain-
tiff now works to prove the cause of accident -and what is more to
the point, to prove fault - are different than when Dean Wigmore
made his study 17 years ago. There were no exhaustive CAB investi-
gations because neither the CAA nor the CAB was even created then.
The Bureau created in 1926 offered no comparable facilities. There
were no such procedures as at present for pretrial discovery, etc. There
was in fact no aviation industry to speak of, as will be discussed later.
There is no industry in which more help is given to the plaintiff than
in air carrier litigation.
Very appropriately, since it is equally of no value today, the pure
conjecture of the American Law Institute is cited as authority when it
opined that aviation was ultra hazardous at about this same time
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(1938). The basis upon which that opinion was based has been clearly
disproven by the actual record of aviation.
I do not challenge the legal authority of the jurists who constitute
the American Law Institute. As lawyers, they speak with authority.
I do definitely challenge their fitness as fact finders to reach such a con-
clusion or that in 1938 they had available sufficient factual data to
support such a conclusion. Except to enumerate most of the dangers,
these worthy gentlemen had heard about the new art of flying, I recall
no factual evidence offered to substantiate their fear. I think it may
be assumed that they knew little about aviation themselves and cer-
tainly not enough to pronounce such drastic judgment.
The learned jurists apparently recognized this situation, for they
based their observation upon "aviation in its present state of develop-
ment." Such a conclusion is utterly valueless in judging aviation today
when aviation has grown from the experimental state of an industry
just getting its start to a seasoned and experienced factor in trans-
portation. For instance, in 1938 when the jurists called aviation ultra
hazardous, just over one million passengers were carried by U.S. sched-
uled domestic air carriers- 1,197,100 to be exact. The passenger
fatality rate was 4.5 per 100 million passenger miles flown. In 1953
over 31 million revenue passengers were carried over 19 billion pas-
senger miles. The domestic passenger fatality rate was 0.6 per 100
million passenger miles flown.'8 In other words, since that pronounce-
ment based upon a situation existing so many years ago, the passenger
traffic has increased over 30 times. The utter lack of present value of
the statement of the Institute is plainly evident.
It has been published that based upon an official examination of
underwriter's claim and settlement records in 1941 (which were this
writer's records), that 86.3% of fatal airline claims examined were
voluntarily settled for substantial amounts and 85% of non-scheduled
commercial fatal passenger claims were similarly settled. I consider
that a conservative statement then and now. I submit that the situation
today, including the discussion under the next question, indicates
clearly that special aviation liability legislation is not indicated be-
cause of the inability of the plaintiff to prove legal negligence under
common law rules.
3. Do Practical Difficulties Unduly Hinder Production of Legally
Competent Evidence to Prove Negligence in Aviation Suits?
It is contended that only a small percentage of death claims reach
actual trial and that the reason for this is that it is often impossible to
prove that negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Such a contention is absolutely unfounded and there could not
possibly be authority for such a statement. It is taken from thin air.
The fact is that in the great majority of trials, the plaintiff has been
18 Estimate by Director, CAB Bureau of Safety Investigation, January 14,
1954.
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successful. Out of 64 recent cases involving passenger and public claims
for injury or death against aeronautical operators examined over a
period of the last few years19 the plaintiff prevailed in 78% of them.
It must be remembered that the operators are not always at fault. The
real reason for the paucity of litigation is twofold:
1. The airlines are sincerely interested in fair settlements with
passengers and the public, and insist that their insurers volun-
tarily offer fair settlements. It is only where excessive demands
are made that the expense and chance of litigation is under-
taken.
2. Some plaintiff's lawyers are reluctant to spend sufficient time
and energy to properly prepare cases and are most interested
in settlement. Such lawyers account for much of the pressure
for imposed liability - to avoid the trouble of proving fault -
and higher limits -which produce higher contingent fees.
It is a fact that in almost every case, the plaintiff has the advice of
the counsel of his own choosing and who are usually of high caliber.
Each would undoubtedly sue if he thought there was negligence in-
volved and a fair settlement was not available without suit. I repeat,
there is no industry that does as much to assist the plaintiff's lawyer
as aviation.
The plaintiff's difficulties are said to be:
1. The aircraft operator, and especially the airline, has control of
all records and physical equipment and properties involved.
This forces the plaintiff to resort to legal process of discovery in
order to determine whether he has cause of action and in order
to organize his case.
No such situation exists. The CAB Bureau of Investigation holds
public hearings promptly on major air carrier accidents. These hear-
ings are not only held by experts but have the power (by subpoena)
and the influence to produce and examine lay and professional wit-
nesses under oath that no private investigator would have. The record
of this exhaustive inquiry is available to any legitimately interested
person immediately or at any later date, and at a nominal prefixed cost
per page. While supposedly inadmissible in a lawsuit, the plaintiff's
attorney, even when entering the case late, has an unprecedented op-
portunity to determine whether he has a cause of action. Not only
that, but he knows exactly what evidence to admissibly secure under
the liberal processes now at his disposal.
2. Whereas the airline is in a position to prepare its defense im-
mediately following a crash, a delay must necessarily follow
before the plaintiff obtains counsel and is able to organize his
suit. As a result, essential physical evidence frequently is han-
dled or moved so as to be difficult or expensive for plaintiff to
examine.
19 CCH Vol. 3 Avi.
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The above discussion shows the complete lack of foundation for
this contention. There is a complete record by experts of the physical
evidence at a fraction of the cost of an on-the-site examination and is
available at any time. The plaintiff can know just as much as the
defendant in preparing his case.
3. Aircraft crashes usually kill all occupants. There are few "in-
side" witnesses.
The complete untruth of this contention has been answered. The
percentage of survival in serious aircraft accidents is about 90%7. Also,
the largest verdicts that I recall against air carriers were in cases in
which there were no "inside" witnesses since all persons aboard were
killed.
4. There are seldom any "outside" witnesses to aircraft accidents,
for the reason that the airlanes are not watched by as many
pairs of eyes as are the highways. Aircraft accidents occur sud-
denly, frequently commence above the overcast clouds and in
remote areas.
Theorists have the absurd idea that if there are no witnesses, negli-
gence can not be proven. With the records kept in aviation, all of
which are made available to legitimately interested parties through
governmental accident inquiries, negligence can be proven, if negli-
gence was present, without the assistance of eye-witnesses inside or
outside the plane.
Let's take an actual airline catastrophe which occurred on an airline
my office represented, but from which all claims are now settled and,
therefore, discussion is permissible. On a regularly scheduled trip of
a certificated airline, a DC-3 airliner crashed into a mountain some
50 miles from its scheduled destination, instantly killing all on board
- both passengers and crew - and the country in which the crash oc-
curred was so wild that there was not a single witness to the accident
or the flight before the accident occurred. It took days to find the
wreck and when found, it was almost completely demolished by impact
and fire.
This is the type of accident that the theoretical lawyer feels is hope-
less, either as to proving negligence or defending a suit in which the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applied. Such a conclusion is completely
unjustified. The fact is that volumes of factual evidence were available
in that case as is usually true in any airline catastrophe. The reason
is that more complete records are kept in airline operation than per-
haps in any industry. There are complete records of past performance
of the aircraft and engines. There is a complete record of all inspec-
tions, repairs and overhauls. There is a complete record of the training
and experience as well as the physical condition of the crew. There
is a complete record of the loading and dispatching of the aircraft, of
the weather before and after the flight was dispatched, with the plan
of flight and all radio conversations during airport control and en
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route. There is a complete record of the examination of the accident
site and of the wreckage by experts. Furthermore, an exhaustive public
investigation - with both the hearing and a transcript of the testimony
available to plaintiff and defendant alike -brings out all technical
and eye-witness evidence far better than any private investigation, since
the Civil Aeronautics Board has the power of subpoena. In what other
industry is so much done for the claimant and his attorney?
In the illustration mentioned, the CAB published, among other
findings of fact, the following:
" (4) All radio range and air navigation facilities were operating
normally with the exception of the Newhall radio range sta-
tion which was inoperative.
" (5) Although the Newhall radio range was inoperative, adequate
radio facilties were available for instrument flight from Las
Vegas to Burbank.
" (6) Although the flight had reported no difficulty up to the time
of the last radio contact at 0337, static conditions and trans-
missions of other flights on the company radio frequency made
the communications of Flight 23 difficult.
" (7) The flight time from 0320 until 0337 was a period of an un-
usual amount of radio communication.
" (9) Other flights had been able to navigate safely through and
about the area of the scene of the accident.
" (10) The position report 'over Newhall' was in error.
" (11) The let-down was started without a positive check on the
position."
"Probable Cause: The Board determines that the probable cause
of this accident was the action of the pilot in making an instrument
let-down without previously establishing a positive radio fix. This
action was aggravated by conditions of severe static, wind in excess of
anticipated velocities, preoccupation with an unusual amount of radio
conversation, and the inoperative Newhall radio range."
What more could any plaintiff want upon which to base a cause of
action and as leads to evidence to prove negligence? The amount of
evidence available is usually limited only by the zeal and intelligence
of the lawyer. Of course, some of our brethern do not want to have to
use either zeal or intelligence. They do not want both parties to have
a fair hearing as provided by our established law. They want liability
arbitrarily imposed on the airline, so that all they have to do is thumb
a code, like looking up a telephone number, to find out what is due
and then collect.
5. Aircraft operation and navigation is highly technical and the
testimony of lay witnesses, when available, is generally indefinite
and of little use.
To the contrary, the testimony of lay witnesses, although not always
essential to proving negligence, has proven most helpful in many cases
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even though they know nothing of aviation. The largest verdicts in
aviation trials have been largely based on the testimony of such lay
witnesses.
6. All physical evidence of what occurred on an aircraft at the
time of and immediately prior to most serious accidents is
usually demolished by the crash, consumed by fire, and occa-
sionally lost under water.
Regardless of the difficulty dreamed up by the theoretical advo-
cates of absolute or special liability to influence the uninformed, the
probable cause is determined in most cases- probably in more cases
than on the highways where there are supposed to be so many "eyes."
This is true even in cases where the plane was demolished in the crash,
constmed by fire or lost under water. As a matter of fact, one of these
conditions is usually present and with the probable cause pointed out,
sufficient evidence to prove negligence should be available, if there was
negligence. That is the reason that about seven out of eight claims are
settled voluntarily and, even in the few cases that go to trial, the plain-
tiff prevails in more than three out of four instances.
I examined all CAB accident reports from December 30, 1946 to
May, 1948 (the date of my examination). There were 37 reports, 28
from certificated airlines and 9 from uncertificated airlines.20 In only
one case out of the 37 did the Board fail to establish the probable cause
of the accident and in only 5 out of the 37 did the CAB fail to charge
the accident to the fault of the operator. I have not had occasion to
repeat the study but have read all reports and believe that both the
probable cause is determined and the cause attributed to operational
fault in ahost all of the cases.
7. The track followed by an aircraft is traced in the sky and cannot
be reconstructed as easily as the course of an object on a high-
way. This makes it difficult for the plaintiff to prove what
happened to an aircraft immediately preceding a crash.
I have personally directed the settlement or litigation of a number
of collision cases and recall no case in which difficulty in establishing
the course of the planes interfered with a clear understanding of what
happened. I recall two fairly recent cases under my direction in which
even the defendant won because the path of colliding planes could be
fixed with convincing exactness.
The conclusion that the plaintiff's difficulties in securing com-
petent evidence are both real and substantial does not appear to be
supported by the unprecedented assistance available to the plaintiff
since the CAB and revised court rules have become established. Nat-
urally, the difficulties could be eliminated by remedial legislation. No
one doubts that to impose liability would lessen the burden of proving
negligence in direct ratio to the liability imposed. The question is
20 Orr, Proceedings of ABA Section of Insurance Law, 1948, p. 152.
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whether it would be just to do so when there is in truth no justifica-
tion for such discriminatory action.
4. Do Administrative Difficulties in the Common Law System of
Liability - Expense, Delay, and Uncertainty of Application of
Common Law Principles and Defenses- Work Undue Hardship
Upon Plaintiffs in Aviation Cases?
The question as to whether the remedial legislation proponents of
imposed liability suggest would work a hardship on the defendant does
not appear to enter into the consideration. Apparently, the plaintiff
only is to be considered. According to the law established in the U.S.A.
-and the law of equal justice- no one is guilty of wrong until so
proven. Certainly nothing in the usual contentions we have discussed
justifies discrimination against the air carrier. He is a useful member
of society performing a service in the public interest, according to
Congress and the Supreme Court. Every modem consideration con-
firms that the plaintiff is no more at a disadvantage in a suit involving
aviation than in any other industry. In justice, the carrier should
assume the burden of using the highest degree of care. But in equal
justice, the person who chooses to use those services should assume
those risks that are beyond the bounds of due care. Even so-called
"innocent" parties on the surface must assume the dangers incident
to modern civilization that are not the fault of someone else. If light-
ning strikes and bums a farmer's barn, killing his livestock - or his
child contracts a fatal malady at school- that is a risk of living that
everyone must assume. Should the school insure the child against
contracting disease? Why in justice should he be insured if an instru-
mentality of modern public service does him damage without fault?
5. Does the Existing Diversity of Liability Standards Among the
Several States Hinder the Development of Aviation?
The development of aviation in the years that have intervened
since the Uniform State Liability Act was considered in 1938 has
answered that quetsion. Passengers have increased from about 1 mil-
lion to 31 million in the U.S.A. Our airlines carry twice as many
passengers as all the airlines of the free world combined although
diversity of liability standards has continued. Certainly, there is some
diversity in liability and of limit recoverable in our several states. Our
form of government is set up that way - a federation of sovereign
states. But there is no conflict. While it may be a burden to tax a
plaintiff's lawyer with any exertion, the laws of every state are avail-
able in any good library in every other state. Plaintiffs have prevailed
and claims have been promptly and fairly handled. History, not
theory, has proven that diversity of liability standards has neither
hindered the development of aviation nor the prompt and fair settle-
ment of claims growing out of air carrier operation.
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6. Does the Present Lack of a Limit Upon the Amount Recoverable
Under the Common Law Constitute a Catastrophe Hazard Which
Creates a Deterrent to the Development of Civil Aviation?
The development of Civil Aviation in the U.S.A. has answered that
question in the negative. There have been a few high settlements and
high verdicts in aviation as there have been with any other common
carrier but the average remains in fair comparison and no scheduled
air carrier has yet failed to fulfill its liability obligations. Imposed
absolute liability, however, would completely change this situation.
7. Is There a Public Need for Compulsory Aviation Liability or Acci-
dent Insurance?
The statement is advanced that persons injured in aircraft acci-
dents seldom recover adequate compensation if the aircraft operation
does not carry liability insurance. This is nothing but purest specula-
tion since there are no reliable statistics on the subject that I know of.
However, I have been intimately connected with the operation of
aircraft and airports for nearly thirty years, including the operation
of the largest civil airport in the world for ten years. I know of no
legitimate claims that were not paid. Certainly it has not been the
rule.
The question of compulsory insurance is not as simple as those
only interested in the payment of damages for the plaintiff seem to
think. It is a complicated question but one that has been answered
with overwhelming finality in the case of automobiles in the U.S. - a
situation involving far more claims. That answer is that every state in
the U.S. and every province in Canada has studied this problem and
there is still, at this writing, only one state (Massachusetts) that imposes
compulsory insurance on automobile owners. The Governor of that
state said in 1953: "The operation of our compulsory automobile in-
surance law has been a source of constant vexation to the people of
the commonwealth... " C. F. J. Harrington, former Commissioner of
Insurance (Massachusetts) said in 1954 that there has been continued
dissatisfaction with that law. In 1954 alone, for instance, there are 70
bills on the subject. "The experience in Massachusetts over 27 years
testifies to the fact that once a compulsory automobile insurance law
is enacted it is difficult, if not impossible, to repeal even though a more
satisfactory substitute may be offered."
This paper deals with air carriers and certainly there is no certifi-
cated air carrier which is not adequately insured and there is no record
of their failure to pay legitimate claims.
The Warsaw Convention has been in effect for more than twenty
years in most principal nations of the world. It does not compel insur-
ance. There is no record of failure to pay legitimate claims.
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8. Would a System of Absolute Limited Liability, Similar to Work-
men's Compensation, Be a Fairer Method of Adjusting Aviation
Losses Than the Present Common Law System?
Proponents of such laws seem agreed that enactment of legislation
applicable to aviation in line with the social philosophy of Workmen's
Compensation laws must be premised upon the conviction that the
traditional common law system of liability based upon fault is not
adaptable to aviation.
Such a conviction should be based upon the proven record that
(1) claimants have been unable to enforce legitimate claims without
litigation, and (2) claimants are not able to successfully prosecute
litigation when necessary to enforce said claims. The record of aviation
is quite to the contrary.
1. After representatives of the CAB legal staff had made an exam-
ination of the underwriter's records of claim handling, they
reported in 1941 that the underwriters have not attempted to
take advantage of the alleged uncertainty and confusion in the
law to affect unreasonably low settlements but that, on the con-
trary, they have made substantial settlements of most claims and
have been fair with each individual claimant." I sincerely be-
lieve that such fine commendation is still merited in 1954.
2. Previous discussions herein should have left no doubt that the
plaintiff has not only had proven success in prevailing in litiga-
tion, but more is done to help him do so than in any other
industry.
The truth is that informed opponents know perfectly well that
claims against air carriers present no more problems because of basing
liability on fault than is the case in any other form of transportation.
They believe - and say so very frankly - that "rules which base lia-
bility on fault are not particularly well adapted to any modern form
of transportation." Regardless of such overwhelming proof as is pre-
sented in this discussion with respect to aviation - and a convincing
record can be shown as to other forms of transportation - proponents
of imposed liability have published such a statement as "in an alarm-
ing percentage of accidents the victim fails to recover what he should
and in a few cases he receives more . . . " In other words, they want
to reform the whole system of law as developed over the centuries.
It is all wrong. Our modern legal reformers know much more than the
collective wisdom of the ages.
The attorneys who have represented these claimants and knew the
circumstances of each case apparently did not know what was right
and fair. "An alarming percentage fails to recover what they should."
The airline's representative also appears not to know what is right
because in a few cases he pays more than he should. A procedure is
therefore suggested similar to the social philosophy of Workmen's
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Compensation laws, whereby absolute liability is imposed and damages
paid in accordance with a set scale of benefits. Of course, this would
to a great extent do away with the necessity of the plaintiff having an
attorney or the courts determining either liability or damages. This
would be in the hands of an agency or bureau, staffed by political ap-
pointment and subject to political pressure. But that is exactly where
the regimenting of liability must necessarily lead. Unless and until it
is proven by facts, not sweeping general statements, that our judicial
process has completely failed, I cannot imagine the legal profession
approving a procedure that would surrender the administration of
justice to centralized bureaucracy.
I have taken some arguments of persons favoring the legal imposi-
tion of liability rather than retaining fault as the basis of liability and
tried to expose them to the light of fact and reason. Many of those
lawyers are my friends and quite as sincere as I am in advocating our
quite different philosophies. I know the subject simply because I have
lived with the practical application of the principles upon which we
differ and believe I can see ultimate injustice and social retrogression
in the suggested reforms that are really the re-establishment of special
privilege. The philosophy of the law has been progressive, keeping
pace with the best interests of civilization. Let us encourage this sound
progress which maintains the balance of justice between all parties
holding each accountable for his own fault rather than arbitrarily
imposing liability upon one innocent party for the benefit of another
who is quite arbitrarily set apart as more deserving.
CONCLUSION
As stated in the beginning, the degree of fault imposed upon the
air carrier is basic to his cost of claims and therefore to his liability
insurance. Of the three degrees of fault:
Liability Based Solely on Fault will result in lowest claim cost
because the carrier or his servant is not always liable. This means
that the carrier will escape liability in cases for which he is not respon-
sible because of lack of due care. From the practical angle, it means
that claims without merit and excessive claims can be better controlled.
The fact that fault has to be proven deters the claimant from present-
ing claims without merit and encourages the compromise of claims of
questionable liability.
Presumed Liability will result in much higher claims costs than if
liability is based solely on fault. This is because the burden of proof
is transferred to the carrier and, since the proof of due care is almost
of necessity factual, there is little doubt that the matter of liability
will get to the jury (or judger of facts) unless there is no rebuttal at
all. This means that suit will be instituted even in cases without merit
(1) in the hope that a sympathetic jury or court will make an award
anyway, or (2) for the nuisance value of getting an unmerited settle-
ment from the carrier in order to avoid the cost and chance of litiga-
tion.
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Absolute Liability places the carrier at the mercy of the claimant
and, with due respect to the idealism of sincere reformers, the majority
of claimants are not merciful. This degree of liability will increase
the cost greatly over even the higher costs of presumed liability. If no
reasonable and absolute limit (without escape for any reason) is pro-
vided, it could well make air carriers uninsurable through commercial
sources and an inexcusable drain upon governmental sureties. Since
most plaintiff's lawyers feel that they can get more from a court award-
ing other people's money than by negotiation on the merits, a great
percentage of cases would go to trial, thus further increasing costs.
Certainly the number of claims would pyramid as every possible claim
would be presented and the possibility of claims is unlimited, as illus-
trated by the ridiculous claims now being made, for instance, acci-
dentally swallowing chewing gum, etc., etc. The carrier would be the
insurer of the public for every injury or damage occasioned by his
operation without any control whatever over the damages he has to pay.
I believe the proponents of absolute liability, who have made any
effort to think further than the immediate humanitarian result they
hope to accomplish, realize that without control this Frankenstein
would destroy the industry. Like all socialistic schemes built on special
privilege instead of equal justice, the answer could only be bureau-
cratic dictatorship. Like Workmen's Compensation laws, the feasability
of absolute liability would depend upon control by an administrative
bureau.
There is, of course, no similarity according to established standards
between the supposedly paternal relationship between master and
servant and the relationship between two independent members of
society, the public and the carrier who is serving the public. No one
familiar with the partisan administration of Workmen's Compensation
laws in most states will contend that equal justice is even attempted.
The only protections of the employer are the limited schedules of pay-
ment and limit of applicability during the time of employment when
a paternal protection is assumed. These safeguards are gradually
being eliminated with higher limits and by extending the scope of
applicability far beyond the time of actual work. Some of this is justi-
fied in keeping economic step with the times. Some is the direct result
of social reformers and vote hungry politicians. In any event, I do not
believe a thinking legal profession would willingly substitute govern-
mental administrative agencies for the legal profession and our estab-
lished judicial processes. A large part of the legal profession now
supporting imposed liability and higher limits would certainly lose
much humanitarian enthusiasm at such a prospect.
The degree of liability imposed on the air carrier is not only basic
in its relationship to claim cost and therefore to liability insurance,
but, of more importance, it is basic to the preservation or loss of equal
justice.
